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8Al-Qaeda since 9/11
DR ALIA BRAHIMI
ECONDS AFTER smiling at her local MP and shaking 
his hand, Roshonara Choudhry plunged a knife into 
his stomach. The attack on Stephen Timms in May
2010 was not the most high profile assault inspired by al-
Qaeda, nor was it fatal. It did, however, offer a com-
mentary on the changing nature of the terrorist threat
since 9/11, al-Qaeda’s major impact on international
relations as well as its major failure, and the intimate,
perhaps inevitable, connection between the two.
Success
Let me begin with al-Qaeda’s major impact, which is the
spectacular democratisation of Islamic authority.
According to her police interview, Choudhry realised
she had an obligation to join in the jihad after viewing a
lecture by Abdullah Azzam on YouTube. Roshonara was
especially drawn in by his explanation of how jihad
becomes obligatory for every Muslim when Muslim lands
are attacked. The argument is that if natives are unable to
expel their attackers, the obligation spreads in the shape of
a circle from the nearest to the next nearest Muslims, until
jihad becomes a duty for individual Muslims anywhere
and everywhere. 
Al-Qaeda’s leaders are eager to portray the concept of
jihad as a popular uprising by individual Muslims.
However, historically, the idea was for Muslim rulers in
neighbouring provinces to come to the aid of their co-
religionists in other parts of the empire. The assumption
was always that all jihads, including defensive ones, would
be led by established Muslim leaders within pre-modern
states or clearly defined communities. 
The architects of global jihad, however, reached out to
Muslims as individuals, rather than as members of
politically organised communities. In the 1990s, al-
Qaeda’s leaders called for Muslim individuals to come
aboard and, quite literally, join them in the caravan of
jihad. Going over the heads of the region’s rulers and
clerics, who had ‘sold out the umma for a handful of
coins’, bin Laden democratised Islamic authority. A
layman with no religious training, he formally declared a
jihad of self-defence, and called upon his fellow Muslims
to come forward individually for training and combat.
This erosion of the state monopoly on violence is an
outgrowth of a larger crisis of authority in the Muslim world,
which is the product of three main developments.
Firstly, the abolition of the caliphate left the Muslim
world without a vestige of centralised leadership, and its
absence was especially keenly felt during the era of
colonialism, with its perceived onslaught on indigenous
cultures and religions. 
Secondly, the conservative Islamic religious
establishment, the ulama, has either been co-opted or
marginalised by regimes presiding over Muslim-majority
countries. This was possible largely because their sources of
independent income were usurped by regimes from
Abdurahman’s Afghanistan to Qadhafi’s Libya. 
Thirdly, and as a consequence of the weakening of the
ulema, laymen have increasingly taken it upon themselves
to interpret the Islamic sources. Indeed, the most
influential ‘Islamic’ texts of the last century were penned
by intellectuals, autodidacts. This process was helped
along in the 20th century by mass education and broader
access to the printed word, and in the 21st century by the
Internet.
Bin Laden’s abiding claim was that the duty of jihad
had been defaulted – indeed, neglected – in a sequence 
of evasion. While the rulers pandered to the Crusaders, 
the ulama were beholden to the rulers. Proper Islamic
authority has vanished. Bin Laden spoke repeatedly of 
the need ‘to fill the vacuum caused by these religiously
invalid regimes and their mental deficiency’, and
presented himself and his circle as the vanguard group
willing to bear that burden and protect the Muslims’
interests in accordance with a true understanding of 
Islam. Hence, Sayf al-Adil, an al-Qaeda military leader,
identified one of the three objectives of the 9/11 attack as
signalling the emergence of a new virtuous leadership
dedicated to opposing the Zionist–Anglo-Saxon–Protestant
coalition.
Failure
Yet as bin Laden’s jihad globalised and authority dispersed,
al-Qaeda fell prey to the tyranny of unintended
consequences. From Baghdad to Baghlan, Amman to
Algiers, al-Qaeda’s victims were predominantly Muslim
and civilian.
Bin Laden was unwilling, but more likely unable, to
control the cycles of misdirected violence perpetrated by
self-defined franchises. He spoke out publicly against
senseless bloodshed and irrational fanaticism. Intercepted
communications showed that he very much disapproved
of the sectarian slaughter and beheadings of hostages that
took place under the banner of Al-Qaeda in Iraq when it
was led by Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi. Atiyeh Abdulrahman’s
entreaty for Zarqawi to stop anathematising the Iraqi
population at large and to defer to Osama bin Laden’s
leadership fell on deaf ears – and some months later
Zarqawi fell prey to a US air strike. I should also note that
Atiyeh himself reportedly met his end in August 2011, in
a Waziristan drone strike.
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Bin Laden’s own authority was far-reaching, no doubt,
but it was simultaneously fragmented. He eroded the
authority of the religious establishment and opened up the
arena of Islamic interpretation, but he was unable to claim
a monopoly over it himself. 
The resulting failure was doctrinal.
None of bin Laden’s arguments overturning the Islamic
principle of civilian immunity retained its force when
Muslims were the victims of al-Qaeda’s attacks. In
particular, the argument used for specifically Muslim
casualties has it that civilians are only killed uninten-
tionally in lawful operation conducted against legitimate
targets, it’s ‘accidental manslaughter’. But the Muslim
civilian is the direct object of attack because he is the only
object of attack.
These deaths were left with no ideological cover – even
from within the radical jihadi’s moral universe.
The resulting failure was existential, metaphysical even.
By muddying the concept of the enemy, bin Laden’s more
reckless progeny confused his movement’s raison d’être.
The foundational narrative had been a poetic one of
victimhood which conferred the legal duty of a defensive
jihad. Al-Qaeda’s mandate was clear and cogent: to defend
Muslims from a Crusader onslaught. Protecting the 
umma was not only its casus belli, but also its existen-
tial commitment. The validity of this claim exploded
alongside the scores of suicide bombers dispatched to
civilian centres with the direct intention of massacring
swathes of Muslim civilians. 
Most importantly, however, the resulting failure was strategic.
For al-Qaeda’s ideologists had always recognised the
fundamental strategic importance of ‘the people’. In the
words of Abu Ubeid al-Qurashi, popular support is ‘at the
same time, the primary aim and the decisive means’. Abu
Mus’ab al-Suri, a strategist of a decidedly Marxist bent,
reflected at length on the mainstream aspirations of al-
Qaeda’s project, arguing that it was ‘not possible for tens
or hundreds of mujahidun here and there, to deter this
fierce international attack… It is absolutely necessary that
the resistance transforms into a strategic phenomenon… after
the pattern of the Palestinian intifada … but on a broader
scale, eventually comprising the entire Islamic world’.
Without popular support, according to Ayman al-
Zawahiri, the mujahidin would be ‘crushed in the
shadows’. Indeed, for al-Qurashi, this would render them
‘no more than a criminal gang’.
Qurashi also cautioned against ‘excess terrorism’,
recognising that ‘if terrorism exceeds the bearable limit, it
will result in negative outcomes’ and will lead to the
uncovering of revolutionary fighters. In Iraq, al-Qaeda’s
fighters were indeed uncovered by their excess terrorism,
by the killing for killing’s sake, as tens of thousands of
Sunnis formed an ‘Awakening’ movement which led to the
expulsion of hundreds of militants from the west and the
north. The crisis this precipitated in al-Qaeda’s ranks was
described as ‘extraordinary’ by its leader in Anbar
province, who stated that the mass defection of ordinary
Sunnis led to ‘the total collapse in the security structure of
the organisation’. But the breakdown of al-Qaeda’s project
in Iraq was not only borne of excessive terrorism, but also
of its failures as a self-defined government, offering a
miserable, brutal quality of life where they took territory.
In referencing a text on guerrilla warfare by Peter Paret and
John Shy, Qurashi also noted that ‘to make terrorism
proper, it must be considered by the people as an effort to
establish a long-awaited justice and a means to ease the
government’s iron fist’. In Iraq, al-Qaeda itself had become
that iron fist.
This state of affairs was a far cry from the momentum
and broad-based sympathy that al-Qaeda had enjoyed at
the height of the US occupation of Iraq. Between 2003 and
2006 in particular, bin Laden’s lyrical narrative of
resistance resonated even beyond the Muslim world. A
German student in my halls at Oxford once returned from
a trip home sporting a bin Laden t-shirt. But, as Rik
Coolsaet observes in his new volume, ‘by the time of his
death, al-Qaeda’s mastermind no longer represented the
Robin Hood icon that once stirred global fascination’. 
A backlash had occurred: 
• from within the ranks – for example, by al-Qaeda’s
commander in Northern Iraq, Abu Turab al-Jazairi,
who expressed outrage at the Algiers bombing of
December 2007 and insisted on the expulsion from
the network of those fighters who harmed al-
Qaeda’s name;
• from other radicals, including bin Laden’s mentor
who asked him publically, whether his means had
become his ends;
• from affiliated groups – as recently as June, a
commander of the TTP in Pakistan split from the
group declaring that he was opposed to the
persistent targeting of Pakistani civilians in mosques
and markets;
• from reformed souls, such as Sayyed Imam al-Sharif
and Noman Benotman, with the latter noting in an
open letter that ‘where there was harmony, you
brought discord’ – a statement tantamount to the
charge of sowing ‘fitna’.
It’s not inconsequential, indeed it’s no coincidence, that
much of this criticism simultaneously cast doubt on bin
Laden’s personal authority to lead a jihad. While al-Odah
dismissed bin Laden as a simple man without scholarly
credentials, Benotman strongly advised bin Laden to seek
the guidance of authentic scholars. He also confirmed that
there had been a dispute between Mullah Omar and bin
Laden about the decision to attack America, and asked: ‘How
can you claim to fight for an Islamic state and then so
flagrantly disobey the ruler you helped put into place… The
question asked by many, even among the closed group was,
by what right did al-Qaeda bypass and ignore Mullah Omar?’
And, I might add, based on the central concern
recurring in all the criticisms of al-Qaeda, moderate and
radical, which invoked the pragmatic/consequentialist
strain of the Islamic jihad tradition: for what?
10
New moon
But what of the way forward for al-Qaeda, ten years on
from 9/11?
If the link between democratised authority and
promiscuous targeting presented the gravest problem for
al-Qaeda, then the further dispersion of authority is also
seen as the solution.
Over the last year or so, the call for jihad has altered
subtly, but significantly. The democratisation of authority
has entered a second stage. A new ideological and strategic
current is championing lone-wolf attacks by Muslim
individuals living in the west, without prior contact with
al-Qaeda networks or consultation with any of its radical
jurists.
Lately, al-Qaeda’s strategists view the Muslim
population in the west as their ace in the hole. As Adam
Gadahn argued in a recent video appearance, Muslims in
the west are perfectly placed to play an important and
decisive role, particularly as America is awash with easily
obtainable firearms.
Further, individual operations are much harder to
detect and intercept because, as al-Qaeda’s Inspire
magazine points out, nobody else in the world needs to
know what these lone operatives are thinking and
planning. The global jihad becomes at once universal and
highly particularised. 
Most importantly, from a strategic perspective, such
operations shift al-Qaeda’s violence out of the Islamic
world and into the western heartland. The aim is to get
back to basics. A few successful examples are routinely put
forward as models for this re-invented jihad al-fard
(individual jihad): 
• Taimour al-Abdeli, who detonated a car bomb and
his own suicide bomb in Stockholm; 
• Major Nidal Hassan, the US military psychiatrist
who went on a shooting rampage at the Fort Hood
army base in Texas; 
• and Roshonara Choudhry, who had no contact with
any radical recruiters or cells, and plotted her attack
on Timms entirely alone.
The emergence of the strain of thought privileging
terrorism by individuals coincides with the rise of al-Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), whose English-language
publications are vigorously re-imagining the landscapes of
jihad.
The glossy pages of Inspire magazine increasingly
advocate ‘individual terrorism’. In a recent letters section,
an anonymous Muslim living in the west asks about the
best way to reach the jihad frontiers. Stay where you are,
he is advised, and focus on planning an operation in the
west instead, like attacking an army recruitment centre or
a nightclub. A few pages later, the military commander
Abu Hureirah calls for an ‘operation in their midst’ in
response to every attack in a Muslim land. The recurring
‘Open Source Jihad’ section advises on how to outfit a
pickup truck with blades so that it can be used to mow
down enemies (Issue II) and on how to make a bomb in
your mum’s kitchen – it’s worth noting that this article
was in the possession of Naser Jason Abdo, the US solider
arrested last month in Texas for allegedly planning to
replicate the Fort Hood shootings.
Also associated with AQAP is the charismatic preacher
Anwar al-Awlaki, whose fluent English, soft intonation and
sharp wit were directed conscientiously at Muslims living in
the west. A trained cleric, his religious addresses were
suffused cleverly with a very articulate brand of anti-
imperial politics. Awlaki was in email contact with Nidal
Hassan and his sermons were found on Choudhry’s
computer. Awlaki captured well the extremes of this second
stage of democratisation when he stated on 8 November last
year that no fatwa or prior consultation with Islamic experts
was necessary to ‘fight and kill Americans’. 
Awlaki’s father defended him against terrorism charges
by observing that, unlike Osama bin Laden, his son was
not a fighter but merely a preacher. However, therein lay
Awlaki’s potency as al-Qaeda’s non-conventional combat
doctrine enters a new phase. In the era of individual
terrorism, the power to inspire is the most significant force
multiplier.
The ‘western lone wolf’ strategy began to take root, in
the US in particular, and it was al-Awlaki’s face that
appeared in al-Qaeda’s new moon. Carlos Bledsoe, a
Memphis native, shot two people outside an army
recruiting office in Arkansas, from a car containing Awlaki
literature. Zachary Adam Chesser, who was convicted of
encouraging attacks on the creators of South Park, had
posted Awlaki’s messages on websites. Michael C. Finton,
who attempted to bomb the offices of an Congressman,
quoted Awlaki on his MySpace page. Others believed to
have lionised Awlaki include Abu Khadir Abdul Latif, Faisal
Shahzad, Sharif Mobley, Colleen LaRose (‘Jihad Jane’), the
2006 Ontario bomb suspects and the Fort Dix attack
plotters. As a result, the US’s latest counterterrorism 
strategy is ‘the first that focuses on the ability of al-Qaeda
and its networks to inspire people in the US to attack 
us from within’, according to Obama’s counter-terrorism
chief.
Needless to say, Awlaki’s death in a drone strike on 30
September 2011 constituted an important setback in al-
Qaeda’s attempt to radicalise an English-speaking
constituency. Samir Khan, a Saudi national who grew up 
in North Carolina and New York, might have adopted
Awlaki’s mantle and continued his work in this regard, but
he was killed in the same strike. An al-Qaeda statement
which confirmed their deaths described them foremost as
‘two brothers... who have done an enormous amount of
work to spread glad tidings to English-speaking Muslims
across the globe’. Awlaki’s propaganda is still readily
available online and, although he cannot now respond to
unfolding events in his characteristically incisive way or
build up personal online relationships with would-be
bombers, in important respects his message lives on.
At the same time, some potential heirs have presented
themselves. On 8 October 2011, for example, the Syrian-
American Al-Shabaab spokesman Omar Hammami
released an audiotape which clearly aimed to immediately
pick up where Awlaki left off. Speaking in his distinctive
Alabama drawl and referencing Slim Fast commercials,
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Hammami urged westerners leading self-centred,
spiritually empty lives to find meaning in jihad, without
waiting for the approval of clerics (an affliction he dubs
‘the scholar fixation’). Another candidate for the role of
western propagandist is the Austrian national, Mohamed
Mahmoud. Freshly released from prison, having
completed a four-year sentence for running al-Qaeda’s
German media arm and for making terrorist threats,
Mahmoud publically declared his intention to return to
spreading al-Qaeda’s worldview. We can expect that effort,
from Mahmoud, Hammami and others, to carry a marked
preoccupation with a western audience.
The intention here is not alarmism about terrorism, but
in fact, optimism. Its changing nature aims to play to our
weaknesses by regenerating the jihadi threat with a native
grasp of language, culture and environment – but in the
end it will play to our strengths. In many ways, as conflict
shapes opponents, so the law-enforcement paradigm has
been thrust upon us by the enemy. And we’re good at 
it. Even the successful operation which killed 9/11’s
mastermind erred significantly from the inter-state war
paradigm – unfolding, as it did, as a covert, surgical,
intelligence-led mission carefully conducted by a
specialised unit within a US-allied country. Crucially,
however, this shift frees us from our own counter-
productivity. Most of the ‘individual terrorists’ I
mentioned cited the long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan 
as integral to mission and motivation. 
Conclusion
Before he died, the umma had stolen bin Laden’s thunder.
The global jihad is still twisting in the breeze of the 
Arab spring. Moreover, in contrast to the AQAP strategy,
communications uncovered at the Abottabad compound
suggest that Zawahiri has been in favour of more localised
attacks, in Iraq and in East Africa. 
And so, the re-invention by Osama bin Laden of one of
the most important Islamic legal ideas, on right authority,
has bequeathed more than doctrinal disarray. It has also
guaranteed fragmentation, and perhaps fracture, within al-
Qaeda’s own authority structures – which may well define
its future. 
Dr Alia Brahimi is a Research Fellow in the Civil Society 
and Human Security Research Unit at the London School of
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of Oxford.
This article is an updated version of Dr Brahimi’s remarks 
for a symposium on ‘9/11: Ten Years On’, hosted by the
British Academy on 2 September 2011.
AT AN EVENT held at the British Academy on 11 October 2011, Dr Omar Ashour (University of Exeter) and Professor
Charles Tripp (School of Oriental and African Studies) discussed ‘The Egyptian Revolution of 2011’. 
Dr Ashour said: ‘On 11 February 2011, Mubarak was removed; on 12 February, I tweeted, “First day on Mother Earth
without Mubarak controlling Egypt. I’m breathing much better”. Most of the revolutionary and political forces in Egypt
saw this as a success, especially as the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) had promised from the outset to
put an end to authoritarianism and to dictatorship, and to move towards a democratic transition in Egypt. Expectations
were high and there was a timeframe of six months for the transition. That was in March 2011. Based on those
promises, Egypt should now have an elected government, but it does not, and it is still in the transitional phase, with
the SCAF as the ultimate authority.
Dr Ashour explained: ‘The lack of leadership during the resistance campaign in January and February 2011 was a source
of strength. No leadership could have been eliminated, because there was none: it was a headless revolution. Now,
however, it is increasingly a source of weakness, because the revolution cannot move forward without leadership. It
seems evident to the military that they are the more coherent and sophisticated actors. Every time other political forces
negotiate with them, it usually comes out with the SCAF being on top.’
Dr Ashour also drew attention to ‘the increasing crackdowns in response to protests by different components of
Egyptian society’, creating ‘a situation that is quite volatile’.
An audio recording of the full discussion can be found via www.britac.ac.uk/events/2011/
